Organizing Committee

• Rahul Jain
• John Ledyard
• Katrina Ligett
• Ashutosh Nayyar
• Ichiro Obara
• Mihaela van der Schaar
• Adam Wierman
• Simon Wilkie
• William Zame

Sponsorship

• UCLA Dept. of Economics
• UCLA Dept. of Electrical Engineering
• USC Dept. of Economics
• USC Ming Hsieh Institute
• Caltech IST
• Caltech Linde Institute

Symposium Flyer [PDF]

Introduction of SoCal NEGT Symposium

This symposium will bring together students, professors, and researchers from Southern California, who apply game theory to analyze, design, and assess the performance of networks. We hope to highlight synergies between various related research areas and encourage discussions regarding the benefits and limitations of game theory as a performance assessment and design tool for networks. Both the application of game theory to networking problems and the development of new game-theoretic methodologies that can be applied in that context are of interest. Topics of interest include (but are not limited to):

• Distributed network resource allocation
• Trust and reputation management
• Security assessment and enhancement
• Dynamic spectrum assignment and management
• Cognitive radio networks
• Dynamic topology formation in networks
• Incentives for cooperation in networks
• Node mobility and route adaptation
• Fairness in forwarding and medium access
• Peer to peer and overlay networks
• Network pricing
• Multiple service provider interactions
• Powerline communication networks
• Electrical power networks
• Formation of social networks
• Biological networks
• Biologically-inspired network design
• Applicability and limitations of game theory in the networking domain
• Algorithmic game theory
• Equilibrium selection among multiple equilibria
• Paradigms of bounded rationality and consequences
• S-modular and potential games
• Price of anarchy
• Games of imperfect or asymmetric information
• Learning mechanisms in games
• Computation of Nash, correlated, and market equilibria
• Preference elicitation and winner determination in combinatorial auctions
• Stackelberg games
• Cooperative game theoretical models
• Multi-stage and repeated games
• Mechanism design