
The Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot Competition

Desmond Cai


Joint work with S. Bose, A. Wierman, S. Low

Electricity markets today



 G_i offers supply function $c(s_i)$ L_i bids demand function $u(d_i)$

Electricity markets today



Market operator solves:

max


 $\sum_{i} (u(d_i) - c(s_i))$

$$s_i = d_i + \sum_{i \to j} f_{ij}$$

s.t. power flow constraints capacity constraints line constraints

 G_i offers supply function $c(s_i)$ L_i bids demand function $u(d_i)$

Electricity markets today



 G_i offers supply function $c(s_i)$ L_i bids demand function $u(d_i)$ Market operator solves:

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
 $\sum_{i} \left(u(d_i) - c(s_i) \right)$

$$s_i = d_i + \sum_{i \to j} f_{ij}$$

s.t. power flow constraints capacity constraints line constraints




Market manipulation is costly



Bid and offer curves are strategic variables – may not be truthful!

Market manipulation is costly




Allocations: d_i^* , s_i^* Locational marginal prices: λ_i^* Bid and offer curves are strategic variables – may not be truthful!



Inefficiency

- 2000-01 California electricity crisis (40-45 billion)
- > 2012 J.P. Morgan (125 million)
- Undetected market manipulation?

Market manipulation is costly



Bid and offer curves are strategic variables – may not be truthful!



Inefficiency


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
Options:


Modify allocation function Modify pricing mechanism (e.g. VCG)


Market operator solves:


max
$$\sum_{i} (u(d_i) - c(s_i))$$
$$s_i = d_i + \sum_{i \to j} f_{ij}$$
s.t. power flow constraints capacity constraints line constraints












1. Equilibrium may not exist under certain market maker objectives.


1. Equilibrium may not exist under certain market maker objectives.

2. Different market maker objectives may lead to completely different market outcomes.



1. Equilibrium may not exist under certain market maker objectives.

2. Different market maker objectives may lead to completely different market outcomes.



See poster for details!