

Incentive Design in Peer Review: Rating and *Repeated Endogenous Matching*

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Joint work with:


Florian Dörfler, ETH Zurich and Mihaela van der Schaar, UCLA

SocalNEGT, Nov. 20, 2014



**Networks, Economics, Communication Systems,
Informatics and Multimedia Research Lab**


How to provide authors with better reviews?



Many other applications, e.g., Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs)

Challenge 1:


Adverse selection – Who reviews whose paper?



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Adverse selection – Who reviews whose paper?


- Classic matching?



Challenge 1:


Adverse selection – Who reviews whose paper?

- Classic matching?
 - Output=function(author's type, reviewer's type)
 - No notion of **effort** → **No moral hazard problem**
 - **One-shot** matching



Challenge 2:


Moral hazard – How to incentivize reviewers?



Challenge 2:

Moral hazard – How to incentivize reviewers?


- Social norms?



Challenge 2:

Moral hazard – How to incentivize reviewers?

- Social norms?
 - Agents are **homogenous** → **No adverse selection problem**
 - **Exogenous** matching → **Myopic** behavior in our setting



Challenge:

Adverse selection + Moral hazard

Our solution:

Rating + Matching?

Challenge:

Adverse selection + Moral hazard

Our solution:

~~Rating + Matching?~~

Rating + ***Repeated Endogenous*** Matching!